Part I
The Unknowable
Chapter 1
Religion and Science
§1. We too often forget that not only is there "a soul of goodness in things evil," but very generally also, a
soul of truth in things erroneous. While many admit the abstract probability that a falsity has usually a
nucleus of verity, few bear this abstract probability in mind, when passing judgment on the options of
others. A belief that is proved to be grossly at variance with fact, is cast aside with indignation or
contempt; and in the heat of antagonism scarcely any one inquires what there was in this belief which
commended it to men's minds. Yet there must have been something. And there is reason to suspect that
this something was its correspondence with certain of their experiences: an extremely limited or vague
correspondence perhaps, but still, a correspondence. Even the absurdest report may in nearly every
instance be traced to an actual occurrence; and had there been no such actual occurrence, this
preposterous misrepresentation of it would never have existed. Though the distorted or magnified image
transmitted to us through the refracting medium of rumour, is utterly unlike the reality; yet in the absence
of the reality there would have been no distorted or magnified image. And thus it is with human beliefs in
general. Entirely wrong as they may appear, the implication is that they originally contained, and perhaps
still contain, some small amount of truth.
Definite views on this matter would be very useful to us. It is important that we should form something
like a general theory of current options, so that we may neither over-estimate nor under-estimate their
worth. Arriving at correct judgments on disputed questions, much depends on the mental attitude
preserved while listening to, or taking part in, the controversies; and for the preservation of a right
attitude, it is needful that we should learn how true, and yet how untrue, are average human beliefs. On
the one hand, we must keep free from that bias in favour of received ideas which expresses itself in such
dogmas as "What every one says must be true," or "The voice of the people is the voice of God." On the
other hand, the fact disclosed by a survey of the past that majorities have usually been wrong, must not
blind us to the complementary fact that majorities have usually not been entirely wrong. And the
avoidance of these extremes being a pre-requisite to catholic thinking, we shall do well to provide
ourselves with a safeguard against them, by making a valuation of opinions in the abstract. To this end we
must contemplate the kind of relation that ordinarily subsists between opinions and facts. Let us do so
with one of those beliefs which under various forms has prevailed among all nations in all times.§2. Early traditions represent rulers as gods or demigods. By their subjects, primitive kings were regarded
as superhuman in origin and superhuman in power. They possessed divine titles, received obeisances like
those made before the altars of deities, and were in some cases actually worshipped. Of course along with
the implied beliefs there existed a belief in the unlimited power of the ruler over his subjects, extending
even to the taking of their lives at will; as until recently in Fiji, where a victim stood unbound to be killed
at the word of his chief himself declaring, "whatever the king says must be done."
In other times and among other races, we find these beliefs a little modified. The monarch, instead of
being thought god or demigod, is conceived to be a man having divine authority, with perhaps more or
less of divine nature. He retains, however, titles expressing his heavenly descent or relationships, and is
still saluted in forms and words as humble as those addressed to the Deity. While in some places the lives
and properties of his people, if not so completely at his mercy, are still in theory supposed to be his.
Later in the progress of civilization, as during the middle ages in Europe, the current opinions respecting
the relationship of rulers and ruled are further changed. For the theory of divine origin there is substituted
that of divine right. No longer god or demigod, or even god-descended, the king is now regarded simply
as God's vicegerent. The obeisances made to him are not so extreme in their humility; and his sacred titles
lose much of their meaning. Moreover his authority ceases to be unlimited. Subjects deny his right to
dispose at will of their lives and properties, and yield allegiance only in the shape of obedience to his
commands.
With advancing political option has come still greater restriction of monarchical power. Belief in the
supernatural character of the ruler, long ago repudiated by ourselves for example, has left behind it
nothing more than the popular tendency to ascribe unusual goodness, wisdom, and beauty to the monarch.
Loyalty, which originally meant implicit submission to the king's will, now means a merely nominal
profession of subordination, and the fulfilment of certain forms of respect. By deposing some and putting
others in their places, we have not only denied the divine rights of certain men to rule, but we have denied
that they have any rights beyond those originating in the assent of the nation. Though our forms of speech
and our State-documents still assert the subjection of the citizens to the ruler, our actual beliefs and our
daily proceedings implicitly assert the contrary. We have entirely divested the monarch of legislative
power, and should immediately rebel against his or her dictation even in matters of small concern.
Nor has the rejection of primitive political beliefs resulted only in transferring the power of a autocrat to a
representative body. The views held respecting governments in general, of whatever form, are now
widely different from those once held. Whether popular or despotic, governments in ancient times were
supposed to have unlimited authority over their subjects. Individuals existed for the benefit of the State;
not the State for the benefit of individuals. In our days, however, not only has the national will been in
many cases substituted for the will of the king, but the exercise of this national will has been restricted. In
England, for instance, though there has been established no definite doctrine respecting the bounds to
governmental action, yet, in practice, sundry bounds to it are tacitly recognized by all. There is no organic
law declaring that a legislature may not freely dispose of citizens' lives, as kings did of old, but were it
possible for our legislature to attempt such a thing, its own destruction would be the consequence, rather
than the destruction of citizens. How fully we have established the personal liberties of the subject against the invasions of State-power, would be quickly shown were it proposed by Act of Parliament to take
possession of the nation, or of any class, and turn its services to public ends, as the services of the people
were turned by Egyptian kings. Not only in our day have the claims of the citizen to life, liberty, and
property been thus made good against the State, but sundry minor claims likewise. Ages ago laws
regulating dress and mode of living fell into disuse, and any attempt to revive them would prove that such
matters now lie beyond the sphere of legal control. For some centuries we asserted in practice, and have
now established in theory, the right of every man to choose his own religious beliefs, instead of receiving
State-authorized beliefs. Within the last few generations complete liberty of speech has been gained, in
spite of all legislative attempts to suppress or limit it. And still more recently we have obtained under a
few exceptional restrictions, freedom to trade with whomsoever we please. Thus our political beliefs are
widely different from ancient ones, not only as to the proper depositary of power to be exercised over a
nation, but also as to the extent of that power.
Nor even here has the change ended. Besides the average opinions just described as current among
ourselves, there exists a less widely-diffused opinion going still further in the same direction. There are to
be found men who contend that the sphere of government should be narrowed even more than it is in
England. They hold that the freedom of the individual, limited only by the like freedom of other
individuals, is sacred. They assert that the sole function of the State is the protection of persons against
one another, and against a foreign foe; and they believe that the ultimate political condition must be one
in which personal freedom is the greatest possible and governmental power the least possible.
Thus in different times and places we find, conceding the origin, authority, and functions of government,
a great variety of opinions. What now must be said about the truth or falsity of these opinions? Must we
say that some one is wholly right and all the rest wholly wrong; or must we say that each of them contains
truth more or less disguised by errors? The latter alternative is the one which analysis will force upon us.
Every one of these doctrines has for its vital element the recognition of an unquestionable fact. Directly or
by implication, each insists on a certain subordination of individual actions to social dictates. There are
differences respecting the power to which this subordination is due; there are differences respecting the
motive for this subordination; there are differences respecting its extent; but that there must be some
subordination all are agreed. The most submissive and the most recalcitrant alike hold that there are limits
which individual actions may not transgress -- limits which the one regards as originating in a ruler's will,
and which the other regards as deducible from the equal claims of fellow-citizens.
It may doubtless be said that we here reach a very unimportant conclusion. The question, however, is not
the value or novelty of the particular truth in this case arrived at. My aim has been to exhibit the more
general truth, that between the most diverse beliefs there is usually something in common, -- something
taken for granted in each; and that this something, if not to be set down as an unquestionable verity, may
yet be considered to have the highest degree of probability. A postulate which, like the one above
instanced, is not consciously asserted but unconsciously involved, and which is unconsciously involved
not by one man or body of men, but by numerous bodies of men who diverge in countless ways and
degrees in the rest of their beliefs, has a warrant far transcending any that can be usually shown.
